Originally published as "Des lycéens et des loups" on dndf.org, 27 October 2026
“The more a dominant class is able to absorb the best people from the dominated classes (the best brains of the people), the more solid and dangerous is its rule.” (Marx, Le Capital, Éditions Sociales, vol. 7, p. 260.)
“The accumulation of crises is unprecedented: heatwaves devastating for agriculture, debts out of control, an explosion in interest rates, falling purchasing power, a housing crisis, rising unemployment, a demoralised civil service, the anger of high-school students. (…) To this may be added a financial crisis and an explosion of unemployment due to the lightning-fast developments of artificial intelligence. In all these domains, France seems to be lagging behind and its government without a solution. A country losing its footing [our emphasis].” (Le Monde, 13/10/26: “Journey through a France on the verge of a nervous breakdown”.)
The government has no budgetary room for manoeuvre, rates are soaring, and “France, scrutinised by financial markets lying in wait, is under the threat of a major financial crisis.”
One has to grasp what is humiliating, for a tottering government that is nonetheless a state, in being stripped bare by high-school students1 from the banlieue, by “Arabs” to put it bluntly, over broken toilets with no soap and no toilet paper, over a shortage of chairs in the classrooms, when we ought to be looking to the East, where the boyars and the muzhiks threaten us in our civilisation and our values. And now, suddenly, our values are reduced to what toilet paper wipes.
When a state collapses, all the accumulated contradictions, until then treated specifically as particular ones, surge up within that collapse. But this is not a matter of “convergence”: in a conjuncture, the determination of events depends on the fraction, on the regional contradiction, which at a given moment gives all the others their signification and their direction (perspective). In the present moment, when the high-school students are the specific revealers of all the contradictions, these contradictions still exist only as impasses. The moment of overcoming that a contradiction contains is the leap beyond the impasse, a leap which the contradiction at first contains only formally and not in potential (potentially). This is not a formal and necessary movement such as would be contained in the concept of contradiction; the overcoming has to be produced. The students’ demands are their own and belong to them; they are situated. To regard them simply as the expression of a “class”, “economic” or “social” contradiction which they would merely manifest “in high-school form” is to understand nothing of the everyday life of the class struggle.
We will not repeat yet again Lenin’s postulate about the “upper classes” and the “lower classes”.
“What is to be done?” (Emmanuel Macron)
What is the maintenance of order?
The present high-school struggle (let us drop the foolish label “high-school movement”) is absolutely different from its predecessors within French capitalism. It is, among other things, the revealer of the crisis of the reproduction of capitalist social relations of production, economically and financially as much as in their political representation. In its specificity, this struggle manifests the decay of the articulation and representation of the relations of production in the state, and the state’s collapse as a political existence, reduced to the police. Despite a few fine words on the “legitimacy of the students’ demands” or concerns about the “high cost of living”, it is the prefect of the PACA region (Jacques Witkowski) who lets the cat out of the bag and delivers the real point of view of the state: “’The number of rioters we are facing, between 7,000 and 8,000 [having estimated them at 17,000 the following day, Sunday, the same prefect would put them at 30,000 on Monday 19 October], is fairly unprecedented in Marseille. We have no memory of a movement of this nature, at any rate one in the middle of the afternoon. We are dealing with something somewhat exceptional,’ he says. With a tense face and a curt tone, the prefect refused to dissociate the thousands of peaceful demonstrators who marched joyfully after 2 p.m., among them many high-school students, amid songs and banners, from the highly mobile groups of looters who were not part of the march [our emphasis]. (…) [The prefect continues:] ‘First of all, it was not a demonstration, because nothing was declared, nothing was stewarded. People did not come to demonstrate, there was no demand, the demand was looting. If you find a placard, I’d be glad to look at it.’” (La Provence, 18 October 2026). This at once affirms the strictly police vision of the state and acknowledges, as a subtext, the porosity between the actors in their diversity and between their practices.
The movement started in the banlieues, in the technical and vocational lycées, in the very places where, traditionally, a high-school movement is not supposed to start. “Vocational lycées and lycées polyvalents, which offer both general or technological tracks and vocational tracks, are over-represented in the list of establishments that have been the scene of violence. (…) In Île-de-France, the epicentre of the movement, 80% of the establishments that suffered damage are vocational or polyvalent lycées, whereas they represent barely half of the country’s lycées. (…) they also make up the majority of the establishments closed by the prefectures. (…) in Paris, one of the first establishments to have its façade burned was the Gaston Bachelard vocational lycée, the most disadvantaged in the capital.” (Le Monde, 18–19/10/26).
The students immediately became “troublemakers”, and often worse, and “manipulated” into the bargain, and therefore unworthy of the answers which the state in any case had neither the intention nor the capacity to provide. The systematic dispatch of the police, the violence of its intervention and the number of arrests are new things in the face of a high-school movement.
“For high-school students, the school concentrates their grievances and constitutes the place where they can act. Blocking its doors makes visible what ordinarily remains behind them: lessons not taught, overcrowded classes, run-down premises, anxiety about their educational orientation and the failure of Parcoursup. To requalify this repertoire of action from the outset as a drift into rioting performs a far more political operation. One stops discussing what the students are saying in order to look for whoever is supposedly speaking in their place. The students disappear as actors. (…) The more public debate focuses on the supposed ringleaders, on insurrection and on arrests, the less space these grievances occupy. The spectacular violence of the clashes then covers over the more ordinary social violence which the mobilisation had come to speak about.” (Olivier Fillieule, Le Monde, 6/10/26).
As Sylvain George writes in a text published on the lundimatin website on 6 October 2026, whose argument we largely take up here: the school question is then displaced onto a terrain where the figure of the dangerous youth and of the neighbourhood to be controlled covers over that of the pupil demanding equal conditions of study. The racialisation of the conflict need not have been programmed as such in order to be produced by the way in which the conflict is handled, made visible and narrated.
Those to whom the political order has already allotted a place must not cross the boundary: by their collective irruption they disturb public order. State violence therefore does not necessarily begin with the first blow of the truncheon. It also begins in the way the state defines those it faces. The category of “urban violence” does not fall upon an undifferentiated social space. For some of the young people mobilised in Saint-Denis, Sevran or Aubervilliers, the police do not appear for the first time with the blockade of the lycée. They already belong to the landscape of public transport, of metro exits and of street stops.
Inequality in the face of police checks involves more than a statistical difference documented by a few official and well-meaning bodies. It means that certain presences pass as ordinary while others must regularly demonstrate that they represent no danger. It is on the basis of this asymmetry that the political figure of the “enemy within” reappears in transformed form. No authority need have conceived this chain of events as a single programme for the effects of several institutions to converge on the same territories and the same people. This is precisely what distinguishes a structural analysis from an intentionalist narrative, since administrations pursuing different objectives can nonetheless produce, in certain lives, a coherent experience of the state.
“The maintenance of order therefore does not merely respond to an already constituted situation. It also helps to determine the form in which that situation will appear. Where a blockade can be treated as a disruption of schooling, the same type of action, in a territory already associated with urban disorder and subject to a heavier police presence, can far more rapidly be apprehended as a security threat. As the school question is translated into the language of public order, the inequalities that gave rise to the movement risk becoming less visible, while the figure of the dangerous youth and of violence to be repressed progressively occupies the space.” (Sylvain George, op. cit.)
The maintenance of order thus restores as normal what the conflict has just made appear intolerable. “Normality” is not a neutral terrain to which disorder would subsequently be opposed; it is the very object of the dispute, since what some call a return to normal is precisely what others have interrupted in order to make its violence visible. The mobilised students are at bottom asking only for what ought already to be there. Educational inequality thus weakens the moral narrative through which future inequalities will be able to be justified. To set upon, by force, adolescents who are worried, and rightly so, about their present schooling as much as about the future it prepares for them is therefore not merely to restore order around a lycée. It is also to renew materially the conditions of social reproduction. The deeper educational inequalities become, the more threatening to the continuity of this order becomes its interruption by those who suffer its effects; repression then helps to consolidate the group of “inheritors” and the order that guarantees succession, by making more costly the challenge mounted by those who inherit neither the same schools, nor the same resources, nor the same protections.
Being at once largely racialised and marked by a class character, the starting point of the struggle is the cradle of all the dynamics running through it, and the origin of the focusing of current social and political contradictions which it carries out without intending to. The struggle challenges social reproduction and makes budgetary choices directly an object of class struggle; it lays bare political choices through its very lack of any possible representation. It has made racialisation not, in itself, an object of struggle, but a “quiet” contradiction within the Republic and the citizen. The burnings and violent blockades are far more widespread than even a channel like CNews can report. While making demands and rising up against unjustifiable injustices, it burns what defines you and lands you in the shit. As the Prime Minister would say: “it’s turning everything into a bloody mess” (elle bordélise).
One can go back to the repression of the demonstration at Sainte-Soline against the construction of a mégabassine (April 2023) to document, for the recent period, the “partisan dimension of the maintenance of order” (Le Monde, 11–12/10/26). Of course the state is a class state and repression is always “partisan”, but it is in the nature of the state never to say so, just as it is in the nature of the norm never to name itself. To show it and to say it is significant of the state’s political collapse. A police deployment such as the one at Sainte-Soline is never mounted when the damage and destruction of public buildings is the work of agricultural unions close to the right and the far right. Gérald Darmanin, currently Minister of Justice and in January 2024 Minister of the Interior, then declared, in the face of the farmers’ movement: “Should we let them get on with it without sending in the CRS? Yes (…) You don’t respond to suffering by sending in the CRS.”
Despite the famous belated, smug and condescending expression handed down from on high about the so-called “legitimate” demands (see elsewhere on the “legitimacy” of the demand), from its origin the high-school struggle is not “legitimate”; it is delivered up to police brutality. It must be said that the struggle did not come from Henri IV or Janson-de-Sailly but from vocational lycées on the Parisian periphery with plenty of “tanned” kids (bronzés). As much as the demands are materially “legitimate”, just as much do they dissolve, evaporate, vanish. The legitimacy of a demand is a construction reciprocally recognised by the one making the demand and by their interlocutor. In the absence of this reciprocity, the demand ends up contradicting and annihilating itself.
By Saturday 10 October (a week before the “riots” of the following Saturday), 6,877 people had already been placed in police custody, 86% of them minors. These students are designated as enemies of the nation. The result was the opposite: repression cemented the mobilisation and strengthened a generational solidarity, and to a greater or lesser degree a community of interests, with those who have a daily experience of police checks and repression.
“A school conflict carried in large part by working-class youth, often already familiar with police checks on public transport, in the streets and in the neighbourhoods where they live, ceases to be administered as a difficulty of the school and begins to be treated as a security problem; as the students block, gather and make the ordinary continuation of school functioning materially impossible, other categories take over: ‘urban violence’, ‘small groups’, ‘rioters’, ‘restoration of republican order’. The racialisation of the conflict does not need to be proclaimed as a programme in order to produce its effects. It can be constituted in the very way in which certain territories are watched, certain presences interpreted, and certain forms of violence rendered immediately credible while others still have to be proven.” (Sylvain George)
The blockade acquires its political meaning. It does not merely prevent access to an establishment; it breaks the ordinary regime in which these difficulties can be dealt with separately. As long as a shortage of teachers remains confined to one classroom, it remains an administrative problem. When hundreds of establishments simultaneously stop functioning, the same question becomes public, because the blockade suspends for a few hours the possibility of continuing to administer separately what is beginning to be recognised as a common condition2 .
The lack of resources and the contempt are the rule of territorial and social relegation and of selection. To burn is to burn what constrains, what selects, what reproduces the state of things and “orients” towards a future without a future. Teachers, heads of school and the civil service in general are increasingly joining the RN; the masks are falling. The fear of an imminent arrival of the RN in power is very concrete for the high-school and university students who initiated the struggle3 . To attack people is to take aim at their function, but also, now, at their individual person. To date (13 October 2026), 88 members of the national education staff, including around 40 heads of establishment (direct puppets of power who have passed every competitive examination in order to become its ridiculous relays of their own free will and to regard themselves as “bosses”), have been deliberately targeted. This is therefore not the traditional “blind violence”. When you are born in Aubagne beneath the Garlaban, even when it is no longer crowned with goats, in a time when there are no more goatherds and no more rock partridges, there is still a hunting rifle in the cupboard. Not every pupil from Aubagne passes the scholarship examination that no longer exists, but the humiliations suffered by Marcel at the Lycée Thiers still exist, always and elsewhere. They are inherent to the school system, which conscientiously accomplishes (could it do otherwise? absolutely not, it is what it is) the task entrusted to it in social reproduction. It has long been recognised that the French education system stands out not only for reproducing social inequalities but above all for aggravating them.
Collapses and porosity
The importance of the high-school struggle lies in the fact that, suddenly, a particular situation, a singular category, brings the social, economic, political and cultural contradictions into focus.
In the high-school struggle, to speak of economic or even political collapse seems self-evident. Why also “cultural collapse”? To speak of cultural collapse, one must consider that if ideology can be defined as the “relation to the relations of production”, it multiplies itself into an infinity of behaviours guaranteeing, for each practice, the adequate relation to the relations of production within the class and gender structure at every moment of life. This relation in fact takes multiple forms (political, trade-union and cultural ideology; place in the social division of labour; familial, sexual, religious ideology, etc.), according to classes, sexes, work, personal history, and the situations and institutions in which these individuals are implicated. Practices pass from one to the other or combine. If all these “particular ideologies” (regional ideologies) function on the same principle and come back to the same relation, a new principle is added in their particular existence, one which follows from what they have genetically in common: depending on circumstances, one of these “regional ideologies” can crystallise the others. With the high-school struggles, it is political ideology, as the one crystallising the others, that collapses. Since 1789, this ideology has rested on the play between “inequalities in fact” and “equality in right”, which can be resolved dynamically, and above all tendentially, by virtue of equality in right. Here we are at the foundation of “French ideology”. In this respect, when the students lay claim to this fundamental principle and at the same time lay it bare as a lie, it is a cultural collapse that is at stake. It must be said that, even if for some time hardly anyone had been fooled, every day we believe in the lie of our freedom as subjects in the name of the citizen.
Passing from the particular to the general, from the political to the economic, incorporating generational, racial and gender dimensions, the movement shows (at the very least…) what a conjuncture might be. An amalgam of situations and socially heterogeneous exasperations, more or less independent of one another, has made this high-school struggle the revealer of the impasses of French capitalism. We will not speak of revolution, but something particular is happening here.
It is customary to say that the high-school movement is not a single, homogeneous object; it is traversed, if not by contradictions, then at least by conflicts; it is divided into fractions, interclassist. Depending on the moment, it is one fraction or another that leads the dance and defines the general atmosphere. There are no “casseurs” on one side and nice “legitimate claimants” on the other. There is a porosity: to proclaim a kind of absolute distinction, a dichotomy, between the demand (even as taken up by institutional political or trade-union forms) and the riotous character of the movement is to fail to see that it is within ordinary struggle that a swerve (écart) can be created, and that this swerve is part of ordinary struggle. To hypostatise the riot is to understand nothing of the riot itself and to make of it an object of militant self-definition, a distinctive identity one prides oneself on. Making this moment autonomous was the impasse, at once practical and theoretical, of the “direct action movement” at the start of the 2000s. One must hold to the “dialectic” between demand, illegitimacy and overflowing (débordement). It is only within this “dialectic” that an overcoming can be produced, and not in the hypostasis of one term. Otherwise the overcoming, considered in a kind of pure existence, for itself, is hors-sol (and has no more taste than the soilless tomatoes of the same name); it evaporates as quickly as the heat that gave birth to it.
Practically, this means being on the side of the overflowing; theoretically, it means understanding the overflowing in its genesis and inscribing it in that genesis, which in turn means practically that the overflowing or the riot is rooted in its oscillation with the demand: no showing off. It is within the “old clothes” of the working class, and even within what are called “the popular classes”, that this strange class called the “proletariat” is constituted.
To say that the struggle does not make demands would be absurd; to say that the demands are not drowned in a climate where they lose their meaning would be equally absurd. “Staff at the establishments most affected by the violence and closures insist that the young people who attacked the buildings and the national education staff are not, for the most part [our emphasis], from the establishments concerned. ‘They are mostly out-of-school young people who come from the surrounding neighbourhoods and who smash things up near where they live, not in the town centres.’4 (…) Vocational lycées are indeed far more often than general lycées located in disadvantaged neighbourhoods.” (Le Monde, 18– 19/10/26). According to another head teacher, at a lycée polyvalent in Béziers, the blockades quickly turned into confrontations with the forces of order when a group of outside youths joined the pupils; nevertheless, of the 13 arrests, 4 were pupils of the lycée. This head teacher continues: “’There was frustration at not being in training. Some must be telling themselves that they are smashing up the establishment they were not able to get into; others, that they are taking revenge for being in a lycée where they did not want to be.’” (ibid.). On Thursday 8 October, pupils at the Saint-Exupéry lycée in the northern districts of Marseille began setting fire to the gate; they were joined by other young people from the neighbourhood; when the firefighters arrived, they were pelted with stones, and their truck was set on fire, with two oxygen cylinders exploding.
Porosity is everywhere. On Saturday 17 October, in Marseille, during the afternoon looting, there were many young people, but: “Behind them, adults fall into step, older men and women who seize the opportunity. (…) Nationally, the watchword is protest against the high cost of living. Here the protest takes the form of actions. (…) Without any organiser or route really being declared to the prefecture, the call for a peaceful gathering at the Vieux-Port has been circulating for several days. At the appointed hour, many demonstrators carrying placards, sometimes even come with their families, find themselves unable to reach the ombrière5 , where clashes are taking place between rioters and CRS. Well into the afternoon, several marches manage to organise themselves and set off in different directions. (…) On the Canebière, brass bands, young demonstrators with placards and rioters mingle [our emphasis]. While some improvise dances or songs, others burn street furniture, take stock of the loot, film it all to post on social media. (…) The forces of order keep their distance, merely channelling the crowd without intervening against the looting. (…) Very young people are present alongside adults of all ages.” (Marsactu). Benoît Payan, mayor of Marseille, after making the customary statement that “the violence obscures the legitimate demands of a generation”, announces that the Vieux-Port fish market is cancelled for the next day (pécaïre!).
So what then?
Making demands, being “legitimate” and not giving a damn
The balance between the demands and the awareness of their untimeliness (inactualité) fluctuates constantly within the very instant of the blockade or the demonstration. Between the so-called “legitimate” demands and the violence, the porosity, and even the collusion, is extremely close, which a head teacher in the Paris region deplores as “the ambivalence of the moment we are going through” (Le Monde, 13/10/2026). The prefect of the PACA region (quoted above) is merely saying things as they are and putting his foot in it.
Since 2023 (Nahel, but also since the Gilets jaunes of 2018–2019), in different circumstances or for different causes, what is new about riots, looting and more or less sought-after confrontations with the police is that they unfold in town centres and, above all, that they are no longer the “tail end” of the “official” demonstrations; they are massive and have their own autonomy, while existing, as with the high-school blockades, in a porosity in which the demand is expressed at the same time as its untimeliness. For some twenty years, a worldwide tendency has been observed towards the affirmation of vast horizontal, leaderless “social movements”, organised through social media, defining themselves by anger and a demand for justice and equality. It is neither by chance nor without reason that, as in the days of the Gilets jaunes, tricolour flags are seen spreading through the marches.
Following the 2008 crisis, which with the subprimes brought into full view the disconnection between the valorisation of capital at the world level and the reproduction of labour power, “undignified living conditions” and inequalities become unbearable, as do the “reforms” of pensions, unemployment insurance, the labour code and, finally, the national education budget, above all in its social and territorial allocation. It is all the instances leading from the relations of production to the self-presupposition of capital, with all the legitimacy they carry, that are coming undone. “Legitimacy” is the ideological knot of the conflict between governments that are devoid of it and the struggles and protest movements, in their diversity of forms, objectives and social composition, which lay claim to it. On the side of the state, of all its apparatuses and of the ruling class, “recognised legitimacy” has been lost. For these struggles, their power, everywhere in the world, lies in their capacity to mobilise legitimacy, which the states facing them and the firms, multinational or not, so cruelly lack. This legitimacy has been lost through the tripartite zoning of globalisation and its repetition at every scale, lost in the decoupling between the reproduction of capital and the reproduction of labour power, lost in the denationalisation of the state.
There have never been, in all the core countries and in all the “peripheries”, so many wildcat demonstrations, blockades, cortèges de tête (blocs at the head of marches), etc. One may rightly regard the diversity of the social composition of all these movements with distrust and suspicion; nonetheless, all of them (down to “Generation Z”, “GenZ”) manifest a delegitimation of all the organs which, from the relations of production to the state, by way of civil society, political representation and the “state apparatuses”, construct the self-presupposition of capital, or rather are produced by it as its organs. There is no longer any political formation to capture the energy of the struggles; La France Insoumise is spinning its wheels in the high-school struggle and, simultaneously, in its “extension” into the struggle against “the high cost of living”. It has to send in the trade unionist or the rank-and-file activist while taking care that the particular, targeted “radical” mobilisation does not undermine its general national, political, statist perspective.
The figure of “social movements”, which appeared in France in 1995, has been overflowed; new forms of action, far from the usual trade-union practices, are appearing. It is not a matter of constructing the image of a radical opposition between the formerly usual forms of social conflict between classes, which would always have been produced and reproduced within the necessary conditions of the self-presupposition of capital, and what would now be their contestation and calling into question. The high-school struggle, in the porosity that characterises it between the “legitimacy of the demands” and the untimeliness of the demand signified to it by the state, finds itself confronted, in its own terms, with the general situation and limit of current struggles, which consists in making the conditions and reasons of the struggle into its own limits. Between the “usual forms” and their calling into question or contestation, what matters most for grasping the present moment is, as the high-school struggle shows, the circulation and porosity of forms of action within the process of one and the same struggle.
What may be called a “social movement” remains a moment of class struggles. To dream of a class acting in an absolutely autonomous way is to imagine a proletariat defining itself by itself and in itself in the face of capital. In the course of current events, their becoming a social movement is entangled with all the other forms in which struggles manifest themselves. This becoming is a thwarted process.
“Student unions, national education unions and parents’ associations offered their protection [during the high-school demonstrations of 6 October]. So many intermediary bodies that the President of the Republic, Emmanuel Macron, and his governments have never ceased to bypass in recent years.” (Le Monde, 8/10/26).
The circulation of the movement now crosses another boundary when part of the teaching and trade-union world begins to join the mobilisation. On 2 October, the high-school and university student organisations emerge from their meeting with the Minister of Education stating that they have obtained no “concrete measures”, and call for a new national day of action on 6 October. The CGT and Solidaires announce their participation, while several teachers’ unions also call on their staff to stand alongside the pupils and to strike that day. The closures of establishments and the bans on gatherings thus come at the very moment when the anger born in the lycées begins to leave the school perimeter alone and to meet other social forces. Thus, to demand the reopening of the lycées is to create a place of consultation and decision-making, but it is also to shut the students in as students when, in their situation as students, they were expressing a totality of contradictions and of non-student situations. In the evolution or internal tendency of the struggle to become a “social movement”, what is at stake is the nature of the contestation: either it remains fully tolerable as long as it remains compatible with the continuity of what it contests; or its status changes as soon as it blocks, and “disagreement” becomes a problem of the functioning and reproduction of the social relations to which everyone is assigned.
This is how a “political subject” is constituted: not through the effacement of social differences and of the distinct relations internal to collective action, but through their being brought into relation in the very course of the mobilisation, so that the common appears less as its starting point than as one of its conflictual and non-necessary products. It is here that the various practices deployed come into play, differentiating themselves, in the constitution of a “common”. In Marseille, on Saturday the 24th, in a demonstration finally authorised by the prefecture and organised essentially by the CGT: “To the beat of the famous ‘Aux armes’ of the OM supporters, the anti-police slogan ‘ACAB’ regularly set the rhythm of the very long march.” (La Provence, 25/10/26)6 .
The promotion of “revolutionary radicality” against “reformism” is a revolutionary normativism which, whatever is said, positions itself as a vanguard holding in trust the revolutionary being of a fantasised class. Porosity, and above all concrete alliance, is what characterises this movement. The looters are neither reformists nor revolutionaries, any more than the rest of the movement’s actors. The “totos”7 are not for the most part the looters, even less so in Marseille than in Paris8 . To privilege certain practices by cutting them off, abstracting them, from the totality is to suppress the very sense and meaning of these practices. The “rank-and-file looter” becomes the “useful idiot” of an ideology. In this struggle, everyone speaks and acts from where they are. Reciprocal recognition is strong enough that, so far, it allows the “all together” (tous ensemble) to endure, producing an interaction between the actors in their practices, despite the gaps in lived experience between the different fractions of the class.
It seems that the European extension of more or less similar struggles, depending on the context (apart from the looting in Barcelona on Saturday 24 October, limited to a few hundred people), belongs to the “social movement” moment of the struggle (with the emphasis placed on housing), owing to the place immediately occupied by the major trade-union organisations in Italy, Spain and Portugal, something the organisations in France are doing with great caution.
This movement has managed to crystallise, as injustices, the wall that French capitalism (insofar as it is “French”…) is up against, and that of its state, reduced, without perspective (economic and political), to the truncheon. French capitalism, a capitalism bottle-fed on subsidies, is at the end of its tether, with no future left. A French capitalism short of productivity gains, which falls back on absolute surplus value through the pursuit of a higher participation rate and longer working hours. From the debt wall to institutional racialisation, by way of the crisis of political and electoral representation and quite simply the conditions of the reproduction of capitalist social relations, not to mention, in these circumstances, the reduction of the state to the exercise of so-called “legitimate violence”, the high-school struggle has coagulated all the crises of capitalism and of the state in France, and it has done so simply by speaking of injustices.
The “debt wall”?
When high-school students engage in a struggle over the resources allocated to their training and to the staff responsible for “educating”, “instructing” and “supervising” them, and when this struggle starts from the lycées of the banlieues or of the former ZEPs (priority education zones) and sets the general tone of the movement, it must be recognised that, as with struggles over taxation, its distribution and its use, in the central areas of the capitalist mode of production the division between surplus labour and necessary labour is only effective at the level of reproduction. What the high-school struggle then brings to light is the crisis of the very reproduction of capitalist social relations in France.
The public debt has been skilfully produced for ages through tax cuts and tax loopholes, through subsidies or tax relief for businesses, and by “entrusting” it to the international financial markets. As it happens, in mid-October 2026, during the presentation of the 2027 draft budget to the National Assembly, the astronomical amount of these aids, subsidies and other forms of tax relief came to light: “The 211 billion euros of aid to businesses, according to the figures of a Senate commission of inquiry, often paid out without any filter or any counterpart, feed shareholders’ incomes without any positive effect for society.” (Nicolas Postel, Le Monde, 18–19/10/26).
From the start of Macron’s first five-year term, in addition to the abolition of the ISF (wealth tax), “production taxes” were cut by 10 billion euros a year, and the corporate tax rate was brought down from 33% to 25%. In 2022, Macron proposed abolishing the contribution on companies’ value added (CVAE), and Bruno Le Maire, Minister of the Economy, was working for his part on a reduction in social charges. The Association of Private Enterprises (Afep) obtained from the Macron government an overhaul of the funding of vocational lycées, including a raising of the ceilings on tax-free donations from 100,000 to 150,000 euros per child and per parent (a threshold that company heads could, still tax-exempt, exceed in a personal capacity)9 .
In Le Ménage à trois de la lutte des classes (Éditions de l’Asymétrie, pp. 271–278), Astarian and Ferro set out in general terms the mechanics and the plumbing of taxation between levies and distributions. What circulates in the plumbing is surplus value, with the exception of the part of the value of labour power taken over by the state: education, health, social benefits, RSA, primes d’activité (in-work benefits), etc. (the “crazy amount of dough”, as Macron puts it). The global purchase of labour power, as an internal and necessary determination of the restructuring of the 1970s and 1980s, together with the stagnation and even decline of the wage share in value added with unchanged or rising VAT rates, have complicated the picture. Taxation has become an essential factor of the wage, both as a growing “redistributed” share of the value of labour power and as a factor in keeping the wage below the value of active labour power. It has become an essential factor not only of the wage but also of the reproduction of classes, diachronically across the succession of generations as much as daily, for housing10 and shopping, etc.
When the state is cut to the bone, this means that taxation has become central to fixing the relation between variable capital and surplus value. The part of the value of labour power that passes through the hands of the state does not function as variable capital, in that it does not (immediately) generate surplus value either for the state itself or, taken individually, for each capitalist who finances the state. Taxation has become a determining element in fixing the relation between variable capital and surplus value and, ultimately, a determining element of the very value of labour power. Through the orientations given by taxation (VAT, local taxes, income tax), a genuine modification of the social and historical norms of the value of labour power is carried out. When VAT is modified, or when some “benefit” or other falls or rises, it is these norms that change; in a word: “if you want to keep driving to work on diesel, you’ll eat less chocolate” (it’s for your own good that VAT is going up on sugary products). In this respect, as a constant factor in the fixing, and in the equally constant modification, of the value of labour power, taxation, as a relation between total variable capital and total surplus value, passes through “the proletarian’s pocket”, which is the living receptacle of this relation. And the proletarian knows it. Increased taxation of goods consumed en masse by proletarians, like the drastic reduction of the public services they benefit from, ends up indirectly reducing the cost of reproducing the workforce for the capitalists.
For the students, to attack a national budget and its allocation across ministries, and then the social and territorial allocation of the envelope, is very much to fight as proletarians or future proletarians. Taxation is a relation between total variable capital and total surplus value; even if the students sell no labour power in exchange for variable capital, it is the future value of their labour power, their wage or their future condition as unemployed, that is at stake, and they know it. For those in the street, the announcement of TotalEnergies’ 11.2 billion euros in profits for the first six months of the year is a provocation that discredits the budgetary argument.
A great misconception, skilfully maintained, concerns public debt: “The drivel about the transfer to future generations of present burdens by means of state debts [our emphasis]. Certainly A can give B, who borrows from him, commodities, a claim on future products […] In fact A and B never consume an atom of this future product. Each generation pays, in effect, its own war costs.” (Marx, Un chapitre inédit du Capital, “pages éparses”, éd. 10/18, p. 304). Marx continues by quoting, without criticism, Piercy Ravenstone, 1824: “In claiming that present expenditure can be pushed into the future and that posterity can be burdened in order to supply the needs of the present generation, one formulates the absurdity that one can consume what does not yet exist and that one can feed on provisions before their seeds have even been sown […] All the wisdom of our statesmen amounts in fact to a great transfer of property from one category of persons to another [our emphasis], by creating an enormous fund to pay for employments and peculation11 .” (Ravenstone, in Marx, op. cit., p. 304).
Let us continue:
“As the national debt is backed by the revenues of the state, which must cover the annual interest payments etc., the modern system of taxation was the necessary complement of the system of national loans. […] On the other hand, the raising of taxation caused by the accumulation of debts contracted one after another compels the government always to have recourse to new loans for new extraordinary expenses. The modern fiscal system, whose pivot is formed by taxes on the most necessary means of subsistence (and therefore by increases in their price), thus contains within itself the germ of automatic progression. Over-taxation is not an accidental occurrence, but rather a principle. In Holland, therefore, where this system was first inaugurated, the great patriot, De Witt, extolled it in his Maxims as the best system for making the wage-labourer submissive, frugal, industrious … and overburdened with work [our emphasis].” (Marx, Le Capital, Éditions Sociales, vol. 3, p. 198.)
In the era of the CSG, of the management of Social Security, of unemployment insurance and of everything falling under the CAF as part of the state budget, of the manipulation of VAT rates, of fuel taxes, of the state’s redistributive policy, it would be simplistic, like Marx in 1847, to regard class struggle over taxation as a zero-sum game. This struggle involves a real modification of the division between surplus labour and necessary labour, if only in the use of the public services necessary to the reproduction of labour power: education, housing assistance. It has become very difficult to distinguish, within compulsory levies, what belongs to the “deferred wage” from what would belong only to tax. What of the national education budget and the tax paid by businesses for vocational training? The training of future labour power is borne fiscally by the “national community”. Is it “deferred wage”, advanced variable capital? That is, would this “fiscal burden” be a portion of surplus value become a kind of anticipated additional capital? The question arises insofar as, especially in Anglo-Saxon countries, when tuition fees (university fees, it is true, and therefore a priori concerning the working class only marginally, but nonetheless concerning a portion of productive workers) are only minimally borne collectively and remain the responsibility of the students, this makes them lifelong debtors on their foreseeable future wage.
When Marx writes: “The abolition of such taxes [those the capitalist pays] makes no change whatever in the quantity of surplus-value extorted by the capitalist at first hand from the worker. It only alters the proportion in which that surplus-value is divided between the capitalist himself and third persons.” (Le Capital, vol. 2, p. 194), it seems legitimate to ask today whether the division between surplus labour and necessary labour is not completed only at the end of the work of the state mincer that churns through half of GDP. Who are these “third persons”? The abolition of such taxes, and the shifting of the resulting loss for the state onto consumption taxes, onto the degradation of public services, onto unemployment benefits, affect the value of labour power in its reproduction and bear on the division between surplus labour and necessary labour. All the more so since, following the note, Marx adds: “Nevertheless, even when circumstances allow the law to operate, subsidiary movements may occur. […] The amount of this fall, the lowest limit of which is 3 shillings (the new value of labour-power), depends on the relative weight thrown into the scale by the pressure of capital on the one side, and the resistance of the worker on the other [our emphasis].” (ibid., pp. 194–195). In the process of the reproduction of the face-to-face of capital and labour power, what becomes of extortion “at first hand”? The present struggle of the high-school students, where it started and where its demands lie, is a class struggle in the strictest sense of the term, not only over the value of labour power but also over dignity and respect, which are the terms under which objective contradictions are often appropriated, subjectivised and lived. Proletarians and their children are not just stomachs.
It must sometimes be acknowledged, as he himself did for some of his writings, that some of Marx’s texts are obsolete, such as the following.
“If all the taxes weighing on the working class were radically abolished, the necessary consequence would be that the wage would be reduced by the whole amount of the taxes that enter into it today. And then one of two things: either the employers’ profit would immediately increase in the same measure, or there would have been only a simple change in the form in which the tax is collected. Instead of advancing directly in the wage, as he does today, the taxes the worker must pay, the employer would no longer pay them by this roundabout route, but directly to the state.” (Marx, “Moralising Criticism and Critical Morality”, 1847, Œuvres philosophiques, éd. Costes, vol. 3, pp. 147–148).
All would be perfect in the best of theoretical worlds, where levies are merely surplus value passing momentarily through the proletarians’ pockets, if an increase in taxes and duties were matched by an increase in the wage. To take figures that are now old (but nothing has improved since, quite the contrary): in 2018 and 2019, social and fiscal measures were supposed to raise the income of an employee on the minimum wage (SMIC) by 32 euros a month by the end of 2019 (that is, 384 euros a year). At the same time, the “flat tax”12 and above all the abolition of the ISF increased the annual income of the richest 0.1% by 86,000 euros on average (Le Monde, 7/3/19).
Following the 2008 financial crisis, which had considerably widened the budget deficit, successive governments used taxation in an attempt to reduce it. From 2013, the “fiscal shock” was coupled with a reduction in business taxation within the framework of the “supply-side policy” (the Responsibility Pact, the Competitiveness and Employment Tax Credit, CICE) introduced under François Hollande. “As the deficit had to be reduced and tax cuts for businesses financed, tax increases on households were offset neither by more benefits nor by more public services.” (Mathieu Plane, economist at the Observatoire français des conjonctures économiques, OFCE, Le Monde, 7/3/19). As for the famous 3% of GDP that the budget deficit must not exceed, European Commissioner Pierre Moscovici (who can hardly be suspected of laxity) declared: “When you remove the measure due to the Competitiveness and Employment Tax Credit (CICE) in France’s 2019 budget, its public deficit falls to 1.9% of GDP. So this problem of tax abolitions can perfectly well be solved within the framework of rules that are flexible and intelligent.” (ibid.).
To conclude: “Public debt has indeed risen from 20% of GDP in 1970 to 120% today. But over the same period, private wealth has increased far more strongly. It has risen from 300% to 600% of GDP, with extreme concentration among the largest financial fortunes. In other words, France’s national wealth (the sum of private and public wealth after deduction of private and public debts) has never been so high, in absolute amount and as a percentage of GDP (which itself has never been so high). In other words, France has never been so rich [our emphasis].” (Thomas Piketty, Le Monde, 18–19/10/26).
Making demands always and nevertheless: the political impasse and the “high cost of living”
The “high cost of living”
On a base of 100 in 2015, food products (excluding meat) reached 125 in April 2025, and meat 130. Nothing has improved since April 2025. Still on a base of 100 in 2015, housing prices rose to an index of 131 in April 2025. If we add property tax, energy expenditure, rental and co-ownership charges, water expenditure, loan repayments and rent, this set of expenditures represents 39% of income per consumption unit for the poorest 25%, and 11.6% for the richest 25%. The litre of domestic heating oil has risen by 36.6% since January 2024; the average benchmark price of natural gas has risen by 59.3%. The INSEE standard shopping basket went from a base of 100 in 2021 to 130 in September 2026. While “pre-committed” expenditures (that is, not including food, transport and fuel, medical care, purchases of clothing and household equipment, and leisure) represent 30.3% for all consumption units, they represent 31.5% for the poorest 20% and 19% for the most affluent. In 2026, for the first time since 1960, purchasing power as measured by INSEE fell for two consecutive years across all consumption units taken together, which gives no idea of the scale of this fall according to social category13 . It may also be noted that the wage share in value added has been falling since the mid-1980s. 20% of the population is overdrawn at the end of every month, 43% at least once a year.
As “consistent Marxists”, we can regard the relations of distribution as the simple obverse of the relations of production (which is correct), and therefore regard the struggle over the “high cost of living” as a superstructure. But there it is: class struggle doesn’t give a damn about superstructures and infrastructures. The importance of the possible effect of the relations of distribution on the relations of production is quite specific to the present crisis: the crisis of the wage relation, the double disconnection between the reproduction of labour power and the valorisation of capital, the crisis of global zoning and its mise en abyme, the identity between a crisis of overaccumulation and a crisis of underconsumption, the asystemic character (asystémie) of the wage demand. With the demonstrations over the cost of living, everything is played out in the ever-changing entanglement of relations of production and relations of distribution. This play between relations of production and relations of distribution is capable of a dynamic from the moment the terms are not regarded as those of an alternative (either the one or the other).
The wage relation is now at the heart of social confrontations because the very success of globalisation has made workers’ consumption the problem relative to growing production. This same crisis of the wage relation becomes a crisis of the wage society and of the legitimacy of the state. The field of class struggle widens from the wage relation to the wage society, in which capitalist relations of production are lived only as relations of distribution. The forms of distribution then become autonomous as an object of class struggle. The injustice of distribution has a culprit who has “failed in its mission”: the state.
Whereas at the apogee of the previous cycle of struggles (in the West), at the end of the 1960s, the emblematic struggles took place at General Motors, at Renault Billancourt or at Fiat, today the emblematic struggles fix on the whole of reproduction. Today it is the conjunction of contradictions at all levels and in all instances of reproduction that constitutes class struggle immediately at the level of reproduction, as the whole of the relation between proletariat and capital.
The restructuring of the 1970s and 1980s moved the contradiction between the proletariat and capital to the level of its own reproduction. As the crisis of this relation, the 2008 crisis in its turn posited the overdetermination of the relations of production by the relations of distribution. It followed that exploitation and the production of value, which are the heart of the capitalist mode of production, determine and exist in the overall, global reproduction that is everyday life in its fetishism, its ideologies and its myths, but also, and thereby, in its capacity to call into question all the instances of the mode of production, and above all the economy as determination in the last instance.
In the capitalist world in crisis since 2008, the uprisings are beyond counting. After the so-called “Arab” revolts, the end of the 2010s saw social peace once again breached in many countries across the globe: Algeria, Iraq, Sudan, Chile, Lebanon, Iran, Hong Kong, Ecuador, Catalonia, Turkey, Mexico with Oaxaca, Réunion in 2012, Brazil in 2013, French Guiana in 2017, Burma/Myanmar in 2021, Peru in 2023, etc. Everywhere demonstrations, riots, occupations of urban space. Everywhere movements without representatives or leadership, mixing demands for social dignity with a contestation of political systems. Everywhere proletarians and middle classes on the way to marginalisation rubbing shoulders behind a common will to “get rid of” (dégager) rulers regarded as cut off from “the people”. If movements of different natures are amalgamated, it is the current contradictions of class struggles, of which “interclassism” is only a symptom, that amalgamate them.
Everyday life and the “high cost of living” have become the place where all the instances of reproduction are knotted together, but also the place where all these instances do not present themselves in their determinative hierarchy between the “economic base” and the “superstructures”. And that is where everything tips over, where representation no longer holds.
The high-school students and the “high cost of living”: an encounter
The mobilisation over “the high cost of living” had been planned before the extension and the turn taken by the high-school struggles; what needs to be understood is why their connection is immediately evident and seems to go without saying. Everything starts from the budget, the state, taxation, the pervasiveness of the relations of distribution. Everyday life becomes the place of the integration of all contradictions, at the risk and peril of the necessary metamorphosis of the relations of production14 . But these are still only the objective reasons; without their political coagulation-transformation they remain a dead letter. Between the high-school struggle and the “high cost of living”, it is a matter of an encounter, not of a convergence, still less of a unification. To go back a few years: Gilets jaunes, demonstrators against the pension reform, radical ecologists at Sainte-Soline, (often) racialised adolescents from the “working-class neighbourhoods”: none of this converged, and it will not “converge” as long as each remains what it is. This strange class called the “proletariat” is constituted only in the calling into question, by all the oppressed and exploited, of what defines them, and not in the demands they make as oppressed and exploited. A “revolutionary conjuncture” is not a “convergence”; it is each particular which, starting from itself and surpassing itself in its relation to the other particulars, becomes global, and not a sum of particulars which, adding themselves up, would constitute the “global”. The global is not a sum, a “convergence”, even though it presupposes a multiplicity of struggles and results from them.
The high-school struggle, for its part, addresses itself to the wallet of the state; it touches a French capitalism which, in the person of its state, has cut itself to the bone. But above all, what is unbearable for the nonentities at the head of the state15 is what this movement, with simple terms of republican and civic justice, amounts to saying, within the very structural lie that justifies and defines those terms: “we too exist”. There is no longer, in the political sphere, any possible mechanism for resolving the internal contradictions of that very sphere.
The high-school struggle, at the outset, is a class struggle, in the end one of the most basic kind, with this “extra” of indicating what a conjuncture might be. That is where the unbearable lies for the French state: the movement is unbearable not because it sets fire to lycée gates or loots shops, but because it is “stupidly”, basically demand-based, at a time when the demand no longer forms a system with the always contradictory reproduction of the mode of production in all its aspects16 .
Demand-based, and rightly so: “A catastrophic and unprecedented fall of 20% in the budget per student since 2017 (…) the higher education budget went from 13.3 billion euros to 15.5 billion in 2026 (+17%). That is true, except that inflation was 22% over the same period, so that the budget fell by 5% in real terms. (…) Concretely, this means that hundreds of thousands of young people worked hard to obtain their baccalauréat, but that nothing was planned to receive them in higher education. In particular, the number of technological and vocational baccalauréat holders has risen sharply, but places in IUTs or BTS courses have not followed. (…) All this in a context marked by the fiasco of the Blanquer reform of the baccalauréat introduced in 2019…” (Thomas Piketty, Le Monde, 18– 19/10/26).
It is not customary, in the theoretical milieu in which this text is immersed, to ask whether it is still pertinent to see in political, organisational and trade-union interventions a framing that waters the struggle down and folds it back onto the agreed course of a “social movement”. What has changed is that these organisations are themselves obsolete. The denationalisation of the state, the end of workers’ identity, the crisis of political representation, the sidelining of “intermediary powers” and of civil society as the representation, in the terms of the state, of the relations of production, confront the state directly with class struggle, with security as its only operative ideology. That is to say, a negative ideology: no future17 . To regard these organisations as simply bringing struggles back within the agreed framework of the “social movement” and “social dialogue” is to forget that “social dialogue” no longer exists: there are only LBDs and 49.3s.
The 2023 pension reform gave this problem a particularly visible form. The executive had constitutional mechanisms at its disposal allowing it to push the reform through despite the absence of a final favourable vote in the Assembly on the adopted text. When refusal moved into the street, another capacity of the state intervened to limit the possibility that this opposition might durably block the country. Constitutional procedure and the police are not of the same nature, but here they meet in one and the same political question: how to govern when refusal no longer lets itself be absorbed by representation. The maintenance of order therefore does not merely put an end to a one-off disorder. It works to restore the conditions under which a legal and social order can continue to function. As long as this was possible, one could designate the field of politics as that defined by any actor legitimately recognised as carrying a demand, or even a contestation, insofar as it did not contest the place assigned to it: it was normal for the worker, as a worker, to call for wage rises.
The high-school struggle is also demand-based; therein lies its strength, in the combination (not so paradoxical as all that) of the demand addressed to a system and the material refusal of that same system. The organisations and unions are in the same impasse, in the same contradiction. They want to be recognised, to be representative; they no longer are, and everyone knows it, but they remain the reference point of mobilisations, their legitimacy, knowing full well that it will be contested and overflowed. They are there, and the demands (always caught in the contradiction of their illegitimacy) nourish their relations to the struggles, insofar as these political and trade-union organisations are themselves, in the terms specific to their existence, caught in the same knot.
Politics
There exists a rather banal conception of the state, foundational for juridical and democratic ideology, which is our everyday lot. On the one hand there would be state power, on the other the state apparatus or the “state machine”, as Marx calls it. The problem lies in the fact that the state apparatus, which materialises in its organs, in their division, their organisation and their hierarchy, the state power of one class (and one only), is at once the organisation of the ruling class (as state power held by the momentarily hegemonic fraction of the ruling class on behalf of that class as a whole) and the organisation of the whole of society under the domination of that class. All the organs of the state apparatus (army, police, administration, courts, parliament, bureaucracy, education, social assistance, information, parties, unions, etc.) then appear only as instruments pliable to the will of those who are their masters. From this double function of the state apparatus (not two functions, but a double function), as the dictatorship of a class and the reproduction of the whole of society, arise at once their fusion and the apparent neutrality of the organs. In this spontaneous thinking, these organs are neutral, and not, in their very existence and their form, the organs of a class dictatorship. It is this “natural” conception of the state that is collapsing, at the same time as “civil society”.
A state collapses when its possession of “legitimate violence” avows itself as pure class violence, when the “state apparatuses” are absorbed by “state power”. The “verticality of power” is only the result and the sign of the disappearance of hegemony. By absorbing its apparatuses, whose necessary apparent neutrality served as its articulation with civil society, state power floats, impotent, losing its grip on society, its organisation of the whole of society under its class domination. Very concretely, the management of demonstrations by Valls and Hollande at the time of the loi travail became systematic under Macron’s two five-year terms: kettling, dissuasive mass arrests and the use of weapons as the basis of police action.
In the denationalisation of the state inherent to the globalisation that gave form to the restructuring of the relation of exploitation in the 1970s and 1980s, democracy, in its institutions, has been emptied of its power of pacified representation as the general will of a society recognised as necessarily conflictual. Democracy recognises social conflictuality as real at the very moment when it is its pacification and its representation as confrontations between citizens. The present evolution of politics manifests a crisis of the hegemony of the capitalist class through its state. Domination and hegemony are not identical; there can be domination without hegemony. Hegemony consists in producing the unavoidable framework of debates and oppositions; it is to impose on the other the very terms of its opposition. When this collapses, all that remains for those worst placed in the game is the club, no longer wrapped in any discourse of political compassion. But it happens that the worst placed lose interest in a game that no longer concerns them.
In La Mésentente: politique et philosophie (Galilée, 1995; in English Disagreement), Jacques Rancière distinguishes politics from the police. For him, the police does not designate the police apparatus alone, but the order that distributes places, functions and competences by determining who may speak, from what position and on what objects. Politics arises when this distribution is interrupted by those who refuse to remain in the place assigned to them and assert, in their very acts, the equality they claim. This is correct, except that when the refusal of one’s place is carried out in the name of equality, it is obviously politics that triumphs, and thereby the state is reinforced. The present question lies in the blockage of this conflictual process as it could once be resolved in that reinforcement.
For his part, for Miguel Abensour (La démocratie contre l’État, PUF, 1997; in English Democracy Against the State), democracy cannot be reduced to the institutions that govern in its name. It remains traversed by the possibility that the demos may surge forth as a “power to act” and prevent the state from closing in on itself as a separate form. Democracy would possess something “insurgent”, not because it is destined for riot or violence, but because the democratic people never entirely coincides with the places that the institutional order reserves for it. But what Abensour neglects is that this non-coincidence, this separation between man and citizen, is the very foundation of democracy (see Marx, On the Jewish Question). It is true that, as Sylvain George stresses with reference to Rancière and Abensour, no longer accepting the place assigned to you is the reason for every revolt. But one does not necessarily thereby go beyond the sphere of politics when the revolt consists only in putting an end to one’s isolation from the state: “The political soul of a revolution consists in the tendency of the classes without political influence to put an end to their isolation from the state and from power. Their standpoint is that of the state, of an abstract entity which exists only insofar as it is separated from real life…” (Marx, “Critical Marginal Notes on the Article ‘The King of Prussia and Social Reform. By a Prussian’”, éd. Costes, Œuvres philosophiques, vol. V, p. 243). To think, as Sylvain George does, that the banlieue high-school students, by refusing the place assigned to them by the school system, have constituted themselves as a “political power” (puissance politique) is to fail to consider what he says elsewhere: “the demand ceases to be merely a request addressed to power (pouvoir) and becomes a power (puissance) capable of disturbing the order to which it is addressed”. Either the “political power” disturbs the political order, but then it is no longer a political power; or it remains one, and its “disturbance” merely reformulates this political order by inscribing itself within its dynamic. With the lycées, the immediate use of force was not a purely technical question; this use belongs to the way in which the state responded to the emergence of a subject it does not entirely master when that subject overflows its assignment.
A significant proportion of those who are today most exposed to police checks, discrimination and coercion belong to the generations issuing from France’s colonial and postcolonial history. “To govern them durably under the sign of suspicion, to make certain territories spaces where police presence becomes almost constitutive of everyday life, and to regard certain gatherings as potentially threatening even before any act has been committed, amounts to installing at the very heart of citizenship a boundary which the law proclaims abolished but which experience continues to make perceptible.” (Sylvain George)18 .
“Naively”19 , the high-school movement put on the table the absolute prohibition on which the very existence of political life in France has rested since 1789: the founding distinction of modern politics between “equality in fact” and “equality in right”. It happens that the demand for “equality in fact” in the name of “equality in right” must be more or less taken into account in order to guarantee the ideology of “equality in right”, while always remaining subordinate to the latter. This subordination, which within the nation-state is the hallmark of the political transposition of “real” contradictions, is not a suppression of the question but a transposition, a kind of translation into a foreign language. Even in the present revolts, the citizen is the operator of this translation; it is then in the name of equality in right that inequality in fact is contested. This is then the triumph of the state, in which all struggles are absorbed. It is the very constitution of classes, passing through all the instances of the reproduction of the mode of production, that includes the transposition (translation, transfer) of the “real” contradictions. It is only in this respect that, with Rancière, Abensour and George, one can still speak of politics. Only in the calling into question of class belonging within the class struggle could this transposition be attacked.
Formally, this last proposition (“only in the calling into question of class belonging within the class struggle could this transposition be attacked”) is perfectly exact only insofar as there exists a middle term, within politics itself, between “equality in right” and “equality in fact”. It happens, as in the high-school students’ struggle, that the demand for “equality in fact” momentarily subverts (because it creates an internal contradiction within right) the very terms of “equality in right”, not by abolishing it as an “illusion” but by seeking to define equality in fact in right.
“Then comes the period of social revolution. With the change of the economic foundation the entire immense superstructure is more or less rapidly transformed. In considering such transformations the distinction should always be made between the material transformation of the economic conditions of production which can be determined with the precision of natural science, and the legal, political, religious, aesthetic or philosophic—in short ideological forms in which men become conscious of this conflict and fight it out [our emphasis].” (Marx, Preface to A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy, 1859.)
R.S.
25 October 2026